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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Millard 
County, State of Utah. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant 
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Is the decision of the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority illegal because it 
interpreted the zoning ordinance to require that the set back be measured from the edge of 
the public right-of-way instead of the lot or parcel line? 
a. Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a district court's determination of 
a land use decision made by a municipal appeal authority under an arbitrary, capricious, and 
illegal standard. Appellant has brought forth his arguments on the basis of illegality. 
Because a determination of illegality is based on the appeal authority's interpretation of 
zoning ordinances, the Court should review the local agency's interpretation for correctness, 
but also afford some level of non-binding deference to the interpretation advanced by the 
local agency. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98 \ 28, 104 P.3d 1208; see also M&S 
Cox Investments, LLC, v. Provo City Corp., 2007 UT App 315, 169 P.3d 789 (Utah, 2007). 
2. Based upon the plain language of the ordinance and the evidence presented to the 
Hinckley Town Appeal Authority regarding the purpose and the intent of the set back 
ordinance, was the Appeal Authority's interpretation correct? 
a. Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a district court's determination of 
a land use decision made by a municipal appeal authority under an arbitrary, capricious, and 
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illegal standard. Appellant has brought forth his arguments on the basis of illegality. 
Because a determination of illegality is based on the appeal authority's interpretation of 
zoning ordinances, the Court should review the local agency's interpretation for correctness, 
but also afford some level of non-binding deference to the interpretation advanced by the 
local agency. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98 ^  28, 104 P.3d 1208; see also M&S 
Cox Investments, LLCy v. Provo City Corp., 2007 UT App 315,169 P.3d 789 (Utah, 2007). 
3. Does the vested rights doctrine apply where Appellant's proposed fence did not 
comply with the set back ordinances in existence at the time he requested a building permit 
and where he subsequently built his fence without having received a building permit? 
a. Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a district court's determination of 
a land use decision made by a municipal appeal authority under an arbitrary, capricious, and 
illegal standard. Appellant has brought forth his arguments on the basis of illegality. 
Because a determination of illegality is based on the appeal authority's interpretation of 
zoning ordinances, the Court should review the local agency's interpretation for correctness, 
but also afford some level of non-binding deference to the interpretation advanced by the 
local agency. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98 ^ 28, 104 P.3d 1208; see also M&S 
Cox Investments, LLC, v. Provo City Corp., 2007 UT App 315,169 P.3d 789 (Utah, 2007). 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
TO THE APPEAL 
1. Pertinent statutes and ordinances are contained in Addendum 1 to this brief. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-707(3) 
2 
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Hinckley Town Code 10-4-8(A) 
Hinckley Town Code 10-4-13(G) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant constructed a fence on his property in violation of the Hinckley Town Code 
in that it encroached on the front yard set back requirement. Several months prior to building 
the fence, Appellant appeared before the Hinckley Town Planning and Zoning Commission 
(the Planning and Zoning Commission") to request a building permit. The Planning and 
Zoning Commission denied Appellant's verbal application for a building permit as the fence 
he proposed would violate the height and set back requirements of the zoning ordinances. 
Appellant then appeared before the Hinckley Town Council ("the Town Council") on two 
separate occasions to request a variance and the Town Council twice denied Appellant's 
requests for a variance. Appellant proceeded to build the fence without having received a 
building permit and Hinckley Town subsequently notified him that his fence was in violation 
of the zoning ordinance. 
Appellant filed an appeal and requested a hearing before the Hinckley Town Appeal 
Authority ("the Appeal Authority"). After receiving evidence and argument from both 
parties, the Appeal Authority upheld the decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission. 
Appellant then filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Appeal Authority's decision in the 
district court. At a scheduling hearing regarding Appellant's petition, the parties agreed to 
submit briefs on the issues before it. Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Hinckley Town filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's Motion. Appellant 
3 
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subsequently filed a reply memorandum. The court affirmed the Appeal Authority' s decision 
and found that it was not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
Appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court, which was subsequently 
transferred to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In 2006, Appellant Alonzo Cahoon built a home on a lot he owns in Hinckley Town, 
Millard County, Utah. (Building Permit, R. 45-461.) Appellant's home faces west with 
Center Street running east and west to the south of Appellant's home. (County Plat Map, R. 
43.) In June, 2007, the Town Council passed an ordinance requiring property owners to 
obtain a building permit prior to erecting a fence on their property. (AA Hearing, R. 197.) 
Appellant appeared before the Planning and Zoning Commission on February 20, 2008 to 
verbally request a building permit for a fence on his property. (AA Hearing, R. 221-222.) 
Appellant's application was denied because his proposal did not conform with the applicable 
height and set back ordinances. (AA Hearing, R. 196-197.) 
On or about February 28, 2008, Appellant appeared before the Hinckley Town 
Council to verbally request a variance for the fence. (Town Council Meeting, R. 58.) 
Appellant indicated that the fence would be six feet in height (Town Council Meeting, R. 62) 
and acknowledged that he would be required to receive a variance in order to proceed with 
*As Appellant has noted, the pagination of the record was not stamped in 
sequential order. Hinckley Town has followed the formatting of the Appellant by 
providing the name of the document or title of each item cited to and the associated 
record page number. 
4 
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construction of the fence as proposed. (Town Council Minutes, R. 47; Town Council 
Meeting, R. 58.) The Town Council denied the request. (Town Council Minutes, R. AT.) 
Members of the Town Council provided Appellant with information on how to appeal the 
Council's decision. Id. Appellant appeared before the Town Council a second time on or 
about May 8, 2008 to request that the Council reconsider his proposal. (Town Council 
Meeting, R. 71.) Appellant represented that he wished to work with the Council to ensure 
that his fence would be in compliance with the ordinances. (Town Council Meeting, R.73.) 
Because Appellant had not made any changes to his proposed fence, he was again denied a 
building permit. Id. Members of the Town Council made suggestions and recommendations 
to Appellant regarding changes that could be made to the fence to bring it into compliance 
with the zoning ordinances. Id. At no time did the Town Council make any assurances to 
Appellant that he would be able to proceed with construction of the fence as proposed, in fact 
he was warned not to begin any construction until a proposal which included the 
recommended changes was presented to the Town Council. (Town Council Meeting, R. 71 -
72.) 
At the May 8, 2008 meeting, Appellant expressed a willingness to comply with the 
recommended changes to his fence and requested that his proposal be discussed at the next 
regularly scheduled Town Council meeting, which was held on or about May 22, 2008. Id. 
Appellant failed to appear at the May 22, 2008 meeting. (Town Council Meeting, R. 74) 
However, the Council addressed the issue of Appellant's fence as it was on the agenda and 
voted to deny the request for a building permit a third time. (Town Council Meeting, R. 74-
5 
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84.) In June 2008, Appellant erected his fence without first having received the required 
building permit and without making any changes to the original proposal. (AA Hearing, R. 
173) Appellant's fence as constructed obstructs vision above the 36 inch limit within the 30 
foot set back. (AA Hearing, R. 183.) 
On or about June 13, 2008, the Hinckley Town Council sent Appellant notice via 
certified mail that his fence was built in violation of the Town's zoning ordinances. 
(Hinckley Town's Answer, R. 24.) Specifically, the notice stated that the fence violated the 
height and set back requirements of Section 10-4-13 of the Hinckley Town Code. (Hinckley 
Town's Answer, R. 25.) Appellant then requested a hearing before the Hinckley Town 
Appeal Authority to challenge the Town's decision that his fence was out of compliance. 
(AA Hearing, R. 142.) 
At the hearing before the Appeal Authority on March 4, 2009, Appellant argued that 
the property adjacent to the south side of his home should be considered his side yard instead 
of his front yard based on the orientation of his home, and therefore, the 30 foot set back did 
not apply. However, based on the plain language of the ordinance both the Appeal Authority 
and trial court found that this interpretation was incorrect. (AA Decision, R. 3 8-39, Findings, 
Conclusions and Order 363-364.) Appellant also argued that the fence was in compliance 
with zoning ordinances as it was set back 35 feet from his property line, based on his own 
measurements. (AA Hearing, R. 154.) In response to Appellant's argument, Hinckley Town 
introduced evidence of a document entitled "Amendment No. 05-06-02. An Amendment to 
the Ordinance 10-14: Supplementary Regulations:, [sic] in the Hinckley Town Code of 
6 
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Hinckley, Utah" ("the Amendment") adopted by the Town Council on June 2, 2005, which 
was intended to amend the set back ordinance to more clearly define set back requirements. 
(AA Hearing, R. 186-188.) The Amendment provides that all set backs shall be determined 
by measurement from where the public right of way ends. Id. The Hinckley Town Plat Map 
shows that in some parts of the Town, the lot or parcel boundary lies at the edge of the 
Town's right of way and in other areas, it lies in the middle of the roadway. (AA Hearing, 
R. 185.) The Amendment was addressed by the Town Council to clarify the Town's 
longstanding policy of measuring set backs from the edge of the right of way in situations 
where a property boundary extends to the middle of a public right of way. Id. Appellant 
objected to the Amendment on the basis that some time prior to the March 4, 2008 hearing, 
Appellant had requested copies of the Town Code and the Amendment was not included. 
(AA Hearing, R. 218.) Hinckley Town conceded that the Amendment was mistakenly not 
included in the codified ordinances (AA Hearing, R. 193: 6-7, 10-12) and offered evidence 
that the interpretation contained in the Amendment was consistent with the policy and intent 
of the ordinance. (AA Hearing 185-188, 205-215.) The Town argued that even absent an 
ordinance defining set back measurements, the set back should be measured from the edge 
of the public right-of-way so as to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens, 
which is consistent with the purpose and intent of the ordinance. Id. 
Appellant also made arguments that during conversations he had with the Hinckley 
Town Mayor and members of the Town Council he was led to believe that the building 
permit was going to be approved and that other fences in town were permitted to be built 
7 
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without complying with the ordinances. (AA Hearing, R. 151-170.) However, Hinckley 
Town offered evidence and argument rebutting such assertions and the Appeal Authority 
ultimately determined that based on the evidence presented, Appellant's claims were without 
merit. (AA Decision, 322-323; AA Hearing, R. 176-205.) 
After the Appeal Authority denied the appeal, Appellant filed a Petition for Review 
and Complaint of the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority's decision to the Fourth District 
Court. (Petition and Complaint, R. 1-13.) On March 8,2010, the trial court issued its Ruling 
upholding the decision of the Appeal Authority and made findings that the plain language 
of the set back ordinance does not mandate that the measurement be made from the lot or 
parcel line and that the purpose and intent of the set back ordinance support the Appeal 
Authority's interpretation. (Findings, Conclusion, and Order, R. 368.) The court considered 
the June 2005 Amendment to the set back ordinance and reasoned that while the Amendment 
is not enforceable as law, it is meant to clarify the ordinance and protect the interest of 
maintaining safety and creating uniformity and that to measure the set back from the parcel 
line, as suggested by Appellant, would undermine both of these interests. Id. The trial court 
also found that the Appeal Authority's failure to provide the Amendment to Appellant was 
not negligent or culpable and that the decision of the Appeal Authority would have been 
reasonable without reference to the Amendment. (Findings, Conclusions and Order, R. 368-
369). Ultimately, the trial court held that the Appeal Authority's decision was not arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. (Findings, Conclusions and Order, 370.) Appellant then filed a Notice 
of Appeal on January 3, 2011. (Notice of Appeal, R. 372-373). 
8 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant constructed a fence on his property in violation of the Hinckley Town Code 
("the Code"). The fence violates the Code in that it does not meet the set back and height 
requirements of Code Sections 10-4-8(A) and 10-4-13(G) as it is a solid fence, exceeding the 
36 inch height limit, constructed within the 30 foot set back. In his Brief of the Appellant 
("Appellant's Brief), Appellant argues that the fence complies with the ordinance because, 
if measured from the lot or parcel line, it is set back more that 35 feet from the lot line. 
Appellant argues that the plain language of the ordinance mandates a set back measurement 
from the lot or parcel line, even though in Appellant's case, the property line lies in the 
middle of a road way, or in the alternative, that the ordinance is ambiguous on its face and 
therefore should be strictly construed in favor of Appellant. However, the plain language of 
the ordinance requires a front yard ofat least 30 feet. The common meaning of "front yard", 
especially in the context of a set back requirement, lends itself to an interpretation that the 
set back is measured from the edge of the roadway. Additionally, the purpose and intent of 
the ordinance, which is to promote safety and uniformity, support such a conclusion. An 
adoption of Appellant's interpretation of the ordinance would produce illogical results that 
would undermine the policy considerations of the ordinances. Thus even if the plain 
language of the ordinance does not include a definition for the terms "front yard" or "set 
back", a review of the purpose and intent of the ordinance clarifies its terms and the 
interpretation of the Appeal Authority is correct. 
Finally, Appellant's argument that he is entitled to application of the "vested rights 
9 
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doctrine" fails because, as illustrated above, the fence he proposed when he applied for a 
building permit, which was substantially similar to the one he ultimately constructed, did not 
comply with the zoning ordinances in effect at the time he applied for the permit. 
Additionally, Appellant did not comply with the procedural requirements of the ordinances 
because, ultimately, he built the fence without ever obtaining a building permit. The purpose 
of the vested rights doctrine is to prevent municipalities from changing zoning ordinances 
once time and expense have been incurred by a landowner in following the necessary 
procedural requirements. Appellant constructed his fence after being repeatedly told that the 
fence did not comply with the set back ordinance, which Appellant himself admitted on 
multiple occasions. The vested rights doctrine does not apply in this case. Appellant failed 
to follow the proper procedure prior to building his fence. He was well aware that his fence 
did not comply with set back requirements of the ordinance and proceeded to the build fence 
anyway, without a building permit.. Accordingly, the decision of the Hinckley Town Appeal 
Authority was neither arbitrary, capricious nor illegal and the decision of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPEAL AUTHORITY'S DECISION TO DENY APPELLANT'S 
BUILDING PERMIT IS CONSISTENT WITH A CORRECT READING OF 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE ORDINANCE, IS CONGRUOUS WITH 
THE COMMONLY ACCEPTED MEANING OF FRONT YARD SET BACK, 
AND PROMOTES THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF THE ORDINANCE, 
The Appeal Authority's interpretation of the set back ordinance is correct because it 
is consistent with both the plain language and the purpose and intent of the ordinance . The 
10 
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Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act ("MLUDMA") governs appeals 
from decisions of municipal land use authorities. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-703. 
MLUDMA provides that "[t]he appeal authority shall determine the correctness of a decision 
of the land use authority in its interpretation and application of a land use ordinance. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 10-9a-707(3). Additionally, MLUDMA provides that any person adversely 
affected by a final decision of the appeal authority may file a petition for review in the 
district court and that the district court must "presume that a decision, ordinance, or 
regulation" made by the appeal authority is valid and "determine only whether or not the 
decision, ordinance or regulation is arbitrary, capricious or illegal." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
10-9a-801 (3)(a)(i-ii). "When a lower court reviews an order of an administrative agency and 
the appellate court exercises appellate review of the lower court's judgment, the appellate 
court acts as if it were reviewing the administrative agency decision directly and does not 
defer, or accord a presumption of correctness, to the lower court's decision." Cowling v. Bd. 
of Oil Gas & Mining, 830 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1991); see also, Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 
2004 UT 98,117, 104 P.3d 1208. However, when reviewing a claim that a decision of the 
appeal authority is illegal, this Court "review[s] a local agency's interpretation of ordinances 
for correctness, but also afford[s] some level of non-binding deference to the interpretation 
advanced by the local agency." M&S Cox Investments LLC v. Provo City Corporation, 2007 
UT App 315 If 29, See also Carrier, 2004 UT 98, If 28,104 P.3d 1208. Moreover, "'in close 
cases [the agency's] interpretation may be a determinative factor in choosing a particular 
interpretation over another." Cox, 2007 UT App 315 H 29, See also Carrier, 2004 UT 98 ^ 
11 
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39. 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by adopting an incorrect standard of review. 
(Appellant's Brief, P. 16.) While Appellee agrees that the appropriate standard of review 
regarding the issue of whether the Appeal Authority acted illegally is correctness, any error 
of the trial court regarding that issue is harmless as this Court's review of the matters on 
appeal is de novo, allowing no deference to the lower court's decision. Here, the Appeal 
Authority clearly used the appropriate standard of review when it found that "the Planning 
and Zoning correctly interpreted the ordinance." (AA Decision, R. 293), (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the Appeal Authority determined that Appellant's fence is in 
violation of the Hinckley Town Code in that it obstructs vision, exceeds 36 inches in height 
and is constructed in violation of the front yard set back. (Addendum: Hinckley Town Code 
10-4-13(G), AA Decision, R. 138.) The term "set back" is not specifically defined in the 
Code. However, under the heading "Front Yard", section 10-4-8(A) of the Code provides 
that "[e]ach lot or parcel in the R Zone shall have & front yard of not less than thirty (30) 
feet." (Addendum: Hinckley Town Code 10-4-8-(A), (emphasis added).) Appellant 
interprets that section to require that the set back be measured from the lot or parcel line. 
However, an adoption of Appellant's interpretation would result in a front yard which 
includes half of an oiled roadway in situations, such as Appellant's, where the property 
boundary extends into the Town's right of way. Such an interpretation is completely 
inconsistent with and contradictory to both the common sense meaning of "front yard" and 
the purpose and intent of the set back ordinance, which is to maintain safety and create 
12 
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uniformity. Accordingly, the Appeal Authority's interpretation is consistent with the plain 
language of the ordinance. 
To the extent that the set back ordinance is ambiguous with regard to where the set 
back should be measured, this Court may look to other modes of construction in reviewing 
whether the Appeal Authority's interpretation of the ordinance is correct. In Carrier, this 
Court stated that "[i]n interpreting the meaning of a[n] . . . ordinance, [the Court] begin[s] 
first by looking to the plain language of the ordinance." Carrier, 2004 UT 98, ^  30. "If the 
plain language of the ordinance is ambiguous, [the Court] may resort to other modes of 
construction." Id. at \ 31. In Cox, this Court determined that if the reviewing court needs to 
rely on other modes of construction, it "'must keep in mind that when interpreting an 
ordinance, it is axiomatic that this court's primary goal is to give effect to the [city's] intent 
in light of the purpose that the [ordinance] was meant to achieve.'" Cox, 2007 UT App 315 
1f 30 (quoting Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,114,993 P.2d 875); See also 
Carrier 2004 UT 98, ^ f 31. Hinckley Town's express policy consideration in 10-4-13(G) is 
unobstructed vision. (Addendum: Hinckley Town Code 10-4-13(G).) In other words, by 
requiring a sufficient front yard set back, passing motorists are able to view persons or 
vehicles exiting property abutting a road within Hinckley Town, which clearly promotes the 
health, safety and welfare of the community. Additionally, an overarching goal of zoning is 
to promote uniformity. Appellant's interpretation of where the setback should be measured 
from would result in varying setback requirements according to where the lot's boundary lies 
or according to the width of roads abutting property in Hinckley Town. Thus, Hinckley 
13 
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Town's desire to promote safety and uniformity in zoning will be entirely undermined. 
Moreover, in addition to the requirement that any interpretation be construed to give 
effect to the Town's intent in light of the purpose that the ordinance was meant to achieve, 
the common meaning of the term must be taken into consideration. Cox, 2007 UT App 315 
Tf 35. This Court stated in Cox that "ordinance terms should be interpreted and applied 
according to their commonly accepted meaning unless the ordinary meaning of the term 
results in an application that is either 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant 
contradiction of the express purpose of the [ordinance].'" Id. See also State v. Souza, 846 
P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); (holding that "If there is doubt or uncertainty as to 
the meaning or application of the provisions of an [ordinance], it is appropriate to analyze 
the [ordinance] in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in 
accordance with its intent and purpose." Cox, 2007 UT App 315 f^ 35.); Rogers v. West 
Valley City 142 P.3d 554, 557, 2006 UT App 3021j 20. 
Appellant claims that based on the plain language of the ordinance, he believed he 
was in compliance with the set back requirement when he built the fence. However, his 
statements and admissions at the Town Council Meetings indicate that he agreed with the 
Town's interpretation of the ordinance with regard to the set back issue and his primary 
disagreement was with the Town Council's interpretation that the property abutting the south 
side of his home was his front yard instead of his side yard. Indeed, this was the main issue 
raised by Appellant at the Town Council Meetings and was one of four primary issues 
Appellant addressed before the Appeal Authority. (Town Council Meeting, R. 58-59,61-68; 
14 
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AA Hearing, R. 143-144, 153-154.) However, Appellant has waived the issue on appeal to 
this Court and the issue is only addressed by Hinckley Town to illustrate Appellant's 
understanding of the set back ordinance before he built the fence. 
Appellant's home faces to the west and the fence at issue sits on property adjacent to 
the south side of his home, abutting Center Street in Hinckley Town. (County Plat Map, R. 
46.) When Appellant originally approached the Hinckley Town Council, after having been 
denied a building permit for his fence by the Planning and Zoning Commission, he admitted 
that his fence would not comply with the fence ordinance if the town considered the property 
south of his home to be his frontage because it would not comply with the 30 foot set back 
requirement. (Town Council Transcript, R. 58.) He conceded that "[b]etween where I am 
proposing to put my fence on my property line there is twenty feet." Id. Appellant argued 
at length that the Council should grant him a variance because he did not understand when 
he built his home that the orientation of his home would dictate what type offence he could 
build. (Town Council Transcript, R. 58,64-65.) Instead of challenging the Town Council's 
interpretation of the set back ordinance, Appellant sought a variance to the existing ordinance 
on the basis that he believed the property abutting the west of his home was his front yard. 
(Town Council Transcript, R. 57.) This is significant because under the fence ordinance, if 
the property abutting Center Street to the south of Appellant's home were his side yard, the 
30 foot set back requirement would not apply, except for to any portion of the fence that 
extends into the front yard set back. (Addendum: Hinckley Town Code 10-4-13(G)). He 
acknowledged that if he was wrong about the front yard issue, his fence would not be in 
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compliance. (Town Council Transcript, R. 58). At the hearing before the Appeal Authority, 
referring to his appearance at the February 2007 Town Council meeting, Appellant stated 
".. .all I'm saying is that I come in here and said, okay, according to what their book says I'm 
wrong." (AA Transcript, R. 234.) It can only be assumed that Appellant made these 
admissions because the common meaning of a frontage set back would be a set back 
measured from the edge of the road way and that the commonly accepted meaning of a front 
yard does not include half of a road way. An acceptance of Appellant's interpretation of the 
ordinance would lead to the exact result this Court has sought to prevent; namely, an 
interpretation that is "unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contradiction to the 
express purpose of the ordinance." See Cox, 2007 UT App 315 ^ 31. 
Additionally, Appellant argues that the set back ordinance must be strictly construed 
in his favor because the issue of where the set back is measured from was not codified. 
However, as shown above, the plain language of the ordinance is clear, even absent a 
definition of "set back" or "front yard." Any ambiguity in the plain language is easily 
clarified by consideration of the common meaning of the terms as well as the purpose and 
intent of the ordinance. Taking those considerations into account, the Appeal Authority's 
interpretation of the ordinance was correct. 
In Cox, this Court provided the appropriate analysis for interpretation of an ambiguous 
ordinance. Id. at f 28. In that case, Provo City was forced to interpret a land use ordinance 
that failed to define the term "average monthly net rental income". Cox, 2007 UT App 315 
Tf 13. Provo City interpreted the term to require consideration of "fair market value" even 
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though that interpretation was not expressly contained within the applicable land use 
ordinance. Id. Cox demanded an interpretation allowing for an infinite amortization period, 
which would effectively create a result that would contravene the purpose of the ordinance. 
Id. at TJ32. This Court held that Provo City's interpretation was legal as it was consistent with 
the language in the ordinance, congruous with the meaning and purpose of an amortization 
period, and it harmonizes the ordinance's provisions in accordance with its intent and 
purposes. Id. at ^  35. Thus, Cox demonstrates that this Court must strictly construe the land 
use ordinance in favor of Appellant only if, after resorting to other modes of construction, 
the ordinance remains ambiguous. Because the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority's 
interpretation of a front set back was in accordance with the common meaning of the term, 
and also gave effect to Hinckley Town's intent in light of the purpose that the ordinance was 
meant to achieve, the interpretation is correct. 
Therefore, as Appellant's interpretation would produce a result that would completely 
undermine the policy and intent of the zoning ordinance and would be contrary to the 
common meaning and application of the ordinance, this Court should find that the Appeal 
Authority's interpretation of the ordinance is correct, and therefore, their decision is not 
illegal. Accordingly, the decisions of the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority and the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT'S AFFIRMATION OF THE APPEAL 
AUTHORITY'S DECISION WAS BASED ON BOTH THE PLAIN 
LANGUAGE AND THE PURPOSE OF THE SET BACK ORDINANCE. 
At the hearing before the Appeal Authority, Appellant argued, for the first time, that 
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his fence was in compliance with the Town's zoning ordinances because, if measured from 
his lot line, which lies in the middle of the roadway, it was not constructed within the thirty 
foot set back. (AA Hearing, R. 154). In response, Hinckley Town presented evidence 
regarding the purpose and intent of the set back ordinance and offered a document entitled 
"An Amendment to Ordinance 10-14: Supplementary Regulations: in the Hinckley Town 
Code of Hinckley, Utah "("the Amendment"). (AA Hearing, R. 186-187,205-215.) Under 
the heading "Recitals", the document states that the purpose of the document is to "better 
define the property line for setback purposes." Id. 
In reviewing the Appeal Authority's decision, the trial court made clear that its 
decision affirming the Appeal Authority's interpretation of the set back ordinance did not 
depend on the Amendment which was presented at the hearing before the Appeal Authority. 
(Findings, Conclusions, and Order, R. 368.) The court made clear that its decision was based 
on both the plain language and the purpose of the ordinance, which is to maintain safety and 
create uniformity. Id. The set back ordinances were enacted by Hinckley Town to promote 
safety and to maintain uniformity within the boundaries of Hinckley Town. Allowing 
Appellant to maintain his fence within the 30 foot set back would be completely contrary to 
the intent and purpose of the ordinances. As the trial court stated, "measuring the setback 
area from the parcel line when that line begins in the middle of a public right-of-way would 
undermine" the Town's interests in safely and uniformity. Id. The trial court went on to say 
that "The Court finds that the Recital is meant to clarify the ordinance and protect these 
interests in situations where a parcel extends into a public right-of-way. Id. Accordingly, 
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though the Recital may not be enforceable as law, it does lend itself to the reasonableness of 
the Appeal Authority's decision." Id. Ultimately, the trial court found that the Appeal 
Authority's interpretation of the set back ordinance would have been upheld regardless of 
the Amendment, as the court's decision was based upon the plain language and purpose and 
intent of the ordinance. 
III. THE VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY WHERE 
APPELLANT'S PROPOSED FENCE WAS IN VIOLATION OF BOTH THE 
FENCE AND SET BACK ORDINANCES IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME HE 
APPLIED FOR THE BUILDING PERMIT. 
The vested rights doctrine only entitles an applicant to approval of a land use 
application if the application conforms to the requirements of the applicable land use 
ordinance in effect when the application is submitted and all fees have been paid. As 
illustrated above, at the time Appellant applied for a building permit for his fence, the 
proposed fence did not comply with the applicable zoning ordinance. 
The vested rights doctrine is an equitable doctrine designed to prevent arbitrary zoning 
changes by municipalities after applicants have invested time and money after relying on 
existing ordinances. This doctrine was first discussed in Western Land Equities Inc v. City 
of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah, 1980) and is now codified in UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-
509. In Western Land, the court found that the Plaintiffs had acquired a vested development 
right because they had substantially complied with the procedural requirements of the city's 
land use ordinances. See Western Land, 617 P.2d at 391. The factual scenario in Western 
Land is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Appellant's case. Appellant first approached 
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the Planning and Zoning Commission to request a building permit and was told that his 
proposed fence would not comply with the set back requirements. (Findings, Conclusions 
and Order, R.364). Appellant then went to the Hinckley Town Council on two separate 
occasions to request a variance, and as no significant changes had been made to his proposed 
fence plan, he was again denied a building permit. (Town Council Minutes, R. 52.) 
Thereafter, Appellant proceeded to build his fence in violation of the ordinance, despite the 
fact that he was well aware that his fence did not comply and had agreed to wait until he had 
the final approval from the Town Council before he constructed those portions of the fence 
that were in violation. (Town Council Transcript, R, 72-73.) Appellant did not follow the 
proper procedures required to build a fence in Hinckley Town. The vested rights doctrine 
is not intended to aid those who are denied building permits for lack of compliance with 
existing ordinances but who decide to proceed with an unauthorized land use regardless. 
Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief under the vested rights doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should hold that the Hinckley Town 
Appeal Authority's interpretation of the set back ordinance was correct, and therefore legal, 
and that the vested rights doctrine does not apply. Accordingly, the decisions of the Appeal 
Authority and the trial court should be affirmed. 
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DATED and SIGNED this Pv day of July, 2011. 
WADDINGHAM & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
'QJQ^k&T^^ 
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ADDENDUM 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
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10-9a-707. Standard of review for appeals. 
(1) A municipality may, by ordinance, designate the standard of review for appeals of land 
use authority decisions. 
(2) If the municipality fails to designate a standard of review of factual matters, the appeal 
authority shall review the matter de novo. 
(3) The appeal authority shall determine the correctness of a decision of the land use 
authority in its interpretation and application of a land use ordinance. 
(4) Only those decisions in which a land use authority has applied a land use ordinance to a 
particular application, person, or parcel may be appealed to an appeal authority. 
History: C. 1953,10-9a-707, enacted by L. 2005, ch. 254, § 67. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 2005, ch. 254 became effective on May 2, 2005, pursuant to Utah Const., 
Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Standard of review. 
A board of adjustment was required to use a "correctness" standard rather than a "rational basis" test 
in reviewing staff interpretation of a zoning ordinance. (Decided under former § 10-9-704.) Brown v. Sandy 
City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
© 2011 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the 
restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10-4-7 LOT AREA PER DWELLING 
Not more than one single-family dwelling, or multiple-family structure(i.e.), a duplex, to a maximum of two 
• (2) units may be placed on a lot area ( see 10-4-3). 
10-4-8 YARD REQUIREMENT 
The following minimum yard requirements shall apply in the R Zone. 
A. Front yard. Each lot or parcel in the R Zone shall have a front yard of not less than thirty (30) feet. 
B, Side yard. Except as provided in sub-section "CM, each lot or parcel of land in the R Zone shall have a 
side yard of not less than ten (10) feet, and the combined sum of the two side yards shall not be less than 
twenty (20) feet 
C. Side yard - Comer lots. On comer lots the side yard contigious to the street shall not be less than 
twenty-four (24) feet and shall not be used for vehicle parking except such portion as is devoted to 
driveway use for access to a garage or carport. 
>, D. Side yard - Driveway. When used for access to a garage, carport, or parking area, a side yard shall be 
wide enough to provide an unobstructed ten (10) foot driveway, 
E. Side yard - Accessoiy building. An accessory building may be located on the property line if, and only if, 
all of the following conditions are met: 
1. The accessory building is located more than six (6) feet to the rear of any main building on the 
same lot or the lot adjacent to the property line on which said building is being placed. 
2* It has no openings on the side which is contiguous to the property line of an adjacent lot 
3. It has one hour fire resistant construction in the wall adjacent to said property line, 
4. It provides for all roof drainage to be retained on the subject lot or parcel. 
An accessoiy building which does not meet the above conditions shall be at least five (5) feet from the side 
property line. 
F. Rear Yard. Each lot or parcel shall have a rear yard of no hss than thirty (30) feet. 
G. Rear yard - accessoiy building. An accessoiy building may be located on the property line so long as: 
1 It h a s n o n n e n i n a s nn th(* ClHf» whi /4i ic /vtntimiroic trk thf* «»ar *\rr\*\Ar+v l«ru» 
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2. It has one hour fire resistant construction in the wall adjacent to said property line. 
3. It provides for all roof drainage to be retained on the subject lot or parcel. 
4. A double frontage or through lot shall have a front yard as required by the respective zone on 
each street on which it abuts* 
An accessory building which does not meet the above conditions shall be at least five (5) feet from the 
rear property line. 
10-4-9 PROJECTIONS INTO YARDS 
A. The following structures may be erected on or projected into any required yard. 
L Fences and walls in conformance with Town codes or ordinances. 
2. Landscape elements, including trees, shrubs, agriculture crops and other plants. 
3. Necessary appurtenances for utility services, 
4. Front steps. 
B. The structures listed below may not project into a minimum front yard* 
1. Porches 
2. Fireplace structures and bays, 
3. Stairways, balconies, decks, fire escapes, and awnings. 
10-4-10 BUILDING HEIGHT 
No lot or parcel of land in the R Zone shall have a building or structure used for dwelling or public assembly 
which exceeds a height of three (3) stories or thirty-five (35) feet, whichever is higher. Roofs 
above the square of the building, chimneys, flagpoles, church towers and similar structures not used for 
human occupancy are excluded in determining height 
10-4-11 PARKING, LOADING AND ACCESS 
Each lot or parcel in the R Zone shall have on the same lot or parcel off street parking sufficient to comply 
with Chapter 13 of this title. Required parking spaces shall not be provided within a required front yard. 
10-4-12 SITE PLAN APPROVAL 
As required by the Uniform Building Code and the requirements of the Hinckley Town building permit. 
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10-4-13 OTHER REQUIREMENTS 
A. Signs. Refer to Chapter 15 Sign Ordinance. 
B, Landscaping. All open areas between the front lot line and the rear line of the main building, except 
driveways, parking areas, walkways, utility area, improved decks, patios, porches, etc., shall be maintained 
with suitable landscaping. 
; C. Junk & Trash Storage. No trash, junk, or unusable materials shall be stored in an open area. All such 
materials must be screened from public streets and adjacent properties, or must be stored within an enclosed 
building. Such materials must be stored in such a manner that it cannot be carried off the premises by natural 
forces, causes, or animals. Any such storage shall not present an objectionable odor or health hazard. 
Violators will be given twenty one (21) days to be in compliance. No Grandfather clause shall apply to this 
provision. 
„ P. Wrecked Vehicles. Wrecked vehicles cannot be parked on public streets for more than seventy two (72) 
I hours. They may not be kept on private property more than thirty (30) days unless screened from public 
streets and adjacent properties, or stored within an enclosed building. No more that six (6) vehicles shall be 
allowed at anytime. Proper rodent and weed control must be adhered to for public safety. No Grandfather 
clause shall apply to this provision. 
E. In-operable/Non-salvageable Vehicles. Such vehicles cannot be parked on public streets. Only two (2) 
such vehicles may be stored within a minimum of one hundred (100) feet from the front property line. All 
other such vehicles must be screened from public streets and adjacent properties, or stored within an enclosed 
building. No more than six (6) vehicles shall be allowed at anytime. Proper rodent and weed control must be 
adhered to for public safety. Violators will be given thirty (30) days to be in compliance. No Grandfather 
clause will apply to this provision. 
F. In-operable Farm Implements. In-operable farm implements may be kept as long as they are in a neat and 
orderly fashion. Proper rodent and weed control must be adhered to for public safety. They may be kept, if 
being used as a landscaping or decorative item in the front yard. Violators will be given thirty (30) days to be 
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G. Walls and Fences. 
Front Yard Fence that does not obstruct the view (e.g. chain link fence) may be erected to a height 
of five (5) feet in any front yard abutting a street within the set back area. The fence shall in no way 
be closed in with adjacent plant material or strips of materials inserted into the fence so as to obstruct 
vision. Any portion of a composite fence above thirty six (36) inches shall not obstruct vision. 
Side Fences not abutting a street shall not exceed six (6) feet in height. This side fence shall not 
extend into the thirty (30) feet front yard set back. 
(J)) Side Fences in the front yard thirty (30) feet front set back shall not be over thirty six (36) inches in 
height These fences shall be made of materials that shall not obstruct vision (for example, chain link, 
. field fence, spaced picket, ect) 
4. Side and Rear Fences abutting a street shall not exceed six (6) feet in height. This side fence shall 
not extend into the thirty (30) foot front yard set back. 
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